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sustained cooperation and space usage
in collectivehousing
MarinaMontelongo Arana and Rafael P.M.Wittek
Department of Sociology,University of Groningen,GroningenNL-9712 TG, theNetherlands
E-mails: m.montelongo.arana@rug.nl and r.p.m.wittek@rug.nl
Collective action is a community resource crucial to ensure the resilience of communities. However, maintaining
cooperation over time is also a significant challenge. Arguing that a major, though neglected, precondition for
community resilience is sustained cooperation, this paper analyses the conditions triggering collective action in
collective housing communities. Particular attention is paid to micro-level pathways through which characteristics of
the common courtyard and the related rules for its use play for the maintenance or decay of collective action. The
contours of an integrated theory of sustained cooperation is sketched. Drawing on Goal Framing (GF) theory and
Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory, it is argued that CPR management institutions can only be effective in a
community in which a normative goal frame is salient. Empirical material is presented from a multi-method
comparative case study of four low-income urban collective housing communities in Mexico City in 2010. This
evidence corroborates both approaches: the two communities characterized by sustained collective action exhibit a
salient normative frame in combination with all elements of CPR managing institutions, whereas the two
communities with failed collective action do not meet these conditions. The results suggest that both mechanisms are
necessary for sustained cooperation to occur.
Keywords: agency, built environment, collective action, community, cooperation, courtyards, housing, resilience, self-
governance, spatial configuration
Introduction
After a strong earthquake in Mexico City in
1985, two collective housing complexes, situated
in two different neighbourhoods, collapsed. The
neighbours, advised by a non-governmental
organization, rebuilt the homes after a long
cooperation process. Twenty years later, neigh-
bours in the first community have neglected
their premises, the common areas are dirty and
abandoned. In contrast, the premises of the
second community are well maintained, and its
members organize a party to celebrate the collec-
tive purchase of solar cells that will power the
light at night.
Resilience is a community’s ability ‘to sustain itself
through change via adaptation and occasional trans-
formation’ (Magis, 2010, p. 401). In the case of collec-
tive housing, key indicators for community resilience
are a well-maintained physical infrastructure and
some degree of social cohesion (for a general discussion
of dimensions of resilience, see also Norris, Stevens,
Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). This
raises an important question: Why do some commu-
nities develop long-term cooperative arrangements
that achieve this, whereas others fail to do so?
So far, five general approaches to answer this question
have emerged. The first, resilience as stability, con-
ceives resilience as the ability of a community to
‘absorb’ disturbance and maintain function. The
second, resilience as recovery, emphasizes the capacity
of a community to ‘bounce back’ after external shock,
usually a disaster (Maguire & Cartwright, 2008).
Many studies in the tradition of these approaches
emphasize the relative importance of physical and
social factors for building resilience (Cutter et al.,
2008; McEntire, 2012). The latter underline
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community social networks and their ability to foster
collective action as an important precondition for a
community to recover from disaster (Adger, 2003;
Aldrich & Meyer, 2015).
Third, transcending the emphasis on system stability
inherent in recovery studies, the socio-ecological
approach conceives communities as dynamic systems,
in which the interactions between the social and the
ecological factors will shape the development of the
system. This approach considers disturbances in the
system as an opportunity for reorganization and for
eventually reaching a higher level of development
(Folke, 2006; Maguire & Cartwright, 2008; Walker,
Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004), shifting the
attention from resources to response options as key
to resilience (Cote & Nightingale, 2012, p. 478).
Fourth, pointing to the limits of socio-ecological, econ-
omic and technological analysis, scholars advocating
an institutional approach (Adger, 2000; Anderies,
Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004) advocate the crucial role
that formal and informal rules and their enforcement
play in ensuring the ability of a socio-ecological
system to adapt to change.
In an important recent assessment of the resilience lit-
erature, Cote and Nightingale (2012) acknowledge
the need for infusing resilience research with insti-
tutional analysis (Adger et al., 2009), but also warn
that attempts focusing mainly on how to ‘get the
rules right’ (Ostrom, 1990) will not provide much
leverage. Key to their alternative, situated approach
to resilience is to ‘move away from attention to insti-
tutional configurations alone, and towards the pro-
cesses and relations that support these structures’
(Cote & Nightingale, 2012, p. 480).
The present contribution follows this lead. More
specifically, drawing on Lindenberg’s Goal Framing
(GF) theory (Lindenberg, 2006, 2014; Lindenberg &
Steg, 2013), it develops the argument that one of the
most advocated institutional configurations for sus-
tained cooperation – Ostrom’s (1990, 2000) design
principles for the management of common pool
resources (CPRs) – will not work unless a collective
orientation, i.e., a normative goal frame, is cognitively
salient in a sufficiently large proportion of the commu-
nity. This proposition is explored with data from a
multi-method qualitative case study on four collective
urban housing communities in Mexico City, carried
out in 2010.
At the centre of this effort is the assumption that sus-
tained cooperation is a major instrument to realize
community resilience. Cooperation is defined as a
joint production between two or more parties (Linden-
berg& Foss, 2011), and it can be sustainable if the out-
comes of the joint production remain valuable for
those involved. The present study focuses on
cooperation in situations where individuals face a
specific type of collective action problem: situations
in which everybody would be better off cooperating,
but where it is individually rational not to cooperate.
This study makes at least four distinct contributions to
the literature on cooperation and community resili-
ence. First, it adds to theories of cooperation by shift-
ing the focus from the triggers of cooperation to the
conditions for sustained cooperation. Second, based
on in-depth qualitative research and elaborating in
detail on the two theories studied, it shows that both
a salient normative goal frame and compliance with
the institutional design principles are necessary con-
ditions to sustain cooperation in common pool situ-
ations. It therefore provides ethnographic evidence
for a theory of sustained cooperation. Third, it devel-
ops an inductive typology of different types of
cooperation in low-income neighbourhoods, thereby
enriching cooperation research with ethnographic
insights on a neglected though important class of
small-scale cooperative behaviours. Finally, the study
provides insight into the link between collective
action and resilience in low income communities, high-
lighting the role of the central courtyard in promoting
or blocking cooperation.
The paper is structured as follows. First, the two theor-
etical frameworks are briefly presented, highlighting
their main assumptions about conditions for sustained
cooperation, as well as how they are related. This is fol-
lowed by a description of the research design and key
characteristics of the four case study sites. Then the
comparative case analysis is presented along with the
conclusions.
Theoretical background
The availability of some common facilities, like a
central courtyard, is a characteristic of many collective
housing projects. This paper argues that, like any other
CPRs, such common space may face the ‘tragedy of the
commons’. As access to the common space is open to
all members of the group, and it is individually rational
to overuse it, the collective outcome may be (1)
depletion of the common pool (Hardin, 1968) and (2)
low levels of cooperation to maintain the resource effi-
ciently. Consequently, the question ‘When will central
courtyards be used in a sustainable way?’ becomes key
to an improved understanding of the conditions that
strengthen or deteriorate sustained cooperation in
housing projects. It is argued below that this question
can be answered by integrating CPR and GF theories.
CPR theory (Ostrom, 1990, 2000) probably is among
the most widely used frameworks to explain sustained
cooperation at the level of local communities. One of
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its key assumptions is that sustained use of CPRs is
possible if appropriate governance structures are put
in place and enforced. But, as Cote and Nightingale
(2012) have observed, one of the major weaknesses
of this neo-institutional economic theory remains that
it focuses on getting the rules right, rather than on
the social and normative conditions that support
these governance structures. The most explicit
attempt to tackle this gap has been offered by
GF theory (Lindenberg, 2006, 2014; Lindenberg &
Steg, 2013). Its main argument is that a collective
orientation translated into a salient normative goal
frame is a precondition for institutions to function.
CommonPool Resource theory
CPRs are:
natural or humanly created systems that generate
a finite flow of benefits where it is costly to
exclude beneficiaries and one person’s consump-
tion subtracts from the amount of benefits avail-
able to others.
(Ostrom, 1990, p. 148)
When dealing with finite natural resources, CPR theory
assumes that the users will have strong incentives to
manage them in a sustainable way. But in order to do
so, individuals need to solve two types of cooperation
problems. First, order cooperation means that individ-
uals limit their own use of the resource. Second, order
cooperation means that individuals actively monitor
and sanction norm compliance of other community
members. The problem is that in both cases individuals
have an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of others
(Heckathorn, 1989). Nevertheless, cooperation can
emerge because most populations do not only consist
of rational egoists who defect in both first- and
second-order cooperation situations, but also con-
ditional cooperators who are willing to bear the costs
of initiating cooperation and sanctioning, and continue
to do so if others reciprocate. Consequently, it is
crucial to facilitate easy recognition of conditional
cooperators, as they will start cooperative actions
based on reciprocity and trust. These initial actions
subsequently can serve as the basis for the design and
implementation of an institutional structure that
reinforces sustainable first- and second-order
cooperation (Ostrom, 2000). Ostrom (1990, 2000)
specified seven of these design principles:1
1. Clearly defined boundaries
Knowledge of who belongs to the group enables
the emergence of trust and reciprocity between
group members. Group activities that strengthen
beliefs about the trustworthiness of other
members can create symbolic boundaries.
2. Equity rules
Congruence between benefit allocation (amount,
time, quantity and technology) and required
inputs (labour, material, money) enhances the
willingness to maintain agreements.
3. Collective and adaptive rules
In order for rules to be effective, efficient and
(perceived as) fair, the rule-making process
needs to be participatory in nature and responsive
to changing context conditions and needs
(Ostrom, 1990, 2000). Tinkering with rules is
necessary to establish the combination of rules
best suited to address particular situations,
rather than striving for optimal, permanent or
unique rules (Ostrom, 2008).
4. Monitoring
Monitoring CPR conditions and user behaviour
encourages norms compliance. If a formal moni-
toring agency is absent, the second-order free
rider problem needs to be solved informally.
5. Gradual sanctions
Graduated sanctions (i.e., sanctions tailored to
the severity of the norm violation and that take
situational and contextual circumstances into
consideration) prevent widespread noncompli-
ance and promote trust-building among partici-
pants. Gradual sanctions are useful to make
offenders know that trust is still there, but a vio-
lation has been noticed. This enhances trust
among participants because they know violations
will be noticed and punished, avoiding general
breakdown of rules.
6. Conflict management arena
Since frequent conflicts have the tendency to
undermine trust, a system in which conflicts are
aired and treated quickly strengthens norm
compliance.
7. Institutional awareness
This principle emphasizes the importance attribu-
ted to recognition by local authorities of the
informal rules established by community
members. Authority’s recognition is necessary
for successful rules implementation.
The opportunity for face-to-face communication
reinforces the positive effect of these design principles,
as communication facilitates the building of trust, reci-
procity and reputations (Ostrom, 1998). Communi-
cation also allows participants to recognize who has
cooperated before and is likely to do so again; it
allows individuals to learn to cooperate (Axelrod,
1984) and to produce and evaluate cooperative
signals (Deutsch, 1949), to express their preferences
and needs (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003), to make
Montelongo Arana andWittek
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commitments and promises, and to reinforce group
identity.
Goal Framing theory
GF theory rests on three key assumptions. First, human
behaviour is to a large degree driven by ‘goal frames’. A
goal frame is a salient overarching goal that dominates
an individual’s mindset in a given situation. GF theory
distinguishes three overarching goal frames. In any
given situation, only one of these goals is dominant,
with the other two goals either reinforce or temper
the salience of the main goal. Individuals in a
hedonic goal frame will strive to realize immediate
pleasure, whereas a salient gain goal frame will
trigger them to realize long-term benefits. Finally,
when a normative goal frame dominates an individ-
ual’s mind, their main concern is to ‘do what is
right’. The salient goal structures an individual’s atten-
tion, i.e., it influences what one likes at that moment,
what information one finds relevant or what one
expect others to do.
Second, the three overarching goal frames differ in a
priori strength, with the hedonic goal frame being the
strongest, followed by the gain goal frame and the nor-
mative goal frame. The latter is the weakest, but also
the major precondition for sustained cooperation.
Whereas the hedonic goal frame does not need much
support to become the salient overarching goal, the
normative goal frame needs continuous strengthening.
Otherwise, it will be displaced by the hedonic or gain
goal as the salient overarching goal frame.
Third, the main factor influencing which of the three
overarching goal frames will be salient is a situational
cue from the environment in an individual’s mind in a
given situation. Consequently, GF theory seeks the
identification of conditions that strengthen or weaken
the normative goal frame. These conditions are highly
context and situation dependent. For example, subjects
in an experiment behaved much more selfishly if the
experiment was labelled a ‘Wall Street Game’, and
they were much more cooperative if the experiment
was labelled a ‘Community Game’ (Liberman,
Samuels, & Ross, 2004). Similarly, GF field exper-
iments showed that the observation of others comply-
ing to a norm increases the relative salience of the
normative goal frame in the observer (Keizer, Linden-
berg, & Steg, 2008). Since the institutional context is
an important source of situational cues, and an adher-
ence to rigid rulesmay reduce an individual’s normative
motivations (Frey& Jegen, 2001),maintaining a salient
goal frame might also require tinkering with rules.
With regard to conditions affecting the salience of the
normative goal frame in a group context, GF research
identified two factors as particularly important
(Lindenberg, 2014): collective identity and feasibility
beliefs. Collective identities are needed for group
members to be able to engage in behaviours favouring
the collective. Individuals must be able to identify with
group interests and objectives, and have some sense of
belonging to a group. Feasibility beliefs reflect the
assessment that cooperative ventures can be successful
and that everyone will benefit from them. Feasibility
beliefs, in turn, are influenced by previous success
experiences, by monitoring and gain for each (impor-
tant for knowing that others will keep contributing),
by legitimate leadership, and by collective identity.
Hence, from a GF perspective, explaining sustained
cooperation in collective housing requires identifying
the conditions that foster or undermine the production
of a strong collective identity and positive feasibility
beliefs. As the empirical analysis below will reveal,
strong external pressures (e.g., threats from the
formal authorities and police), the need to take
urgent action (e.g., due to construction problems), as
well as the characteristics of the courtyard (e.g., size
and form) play a major role here. More specifically,
feasibility beliefs increase where courtyards foster
friendly informal interaction, but they suffer where
lack of space causes irritations and conflicts.
Integrated framework:aGoalFraming theory
of CommonPool Resourcemanagement
Both theories are complementary in that they empha-
size norms and the importance of ensuring compliance
to the related formal and informal rules. CPR theory
describes the institutional conditions that allow
group members to identify conditional cooperators,
and to monitor and sanction those who break the
rules. GF theory points to a crucial precondition for
this mechanism to function, but that is lacking in
CPR theory: a shared and salient cognitive orientation
to the collective. Without the activation of such a nor-
mative goal frame, the design principles will not work.
Clearly defined boundaries (principle 1) will not work
if there is no identification with the group inside these
boundaries. For rules to have a regulating effect, indi-
viduals need to feel an obligation to follow them (prin-
ciples 2 and 3). For group members to bear the costs of
monitoring and sanctioning (principles 4, 5 and 7),
they need to have a motivation to do so, and they
need to accept the related informal rules in the first
place. And for a common arena like a courtyard actu-
ally to facilitate conflict management, a normative goal
frame is necessary for group members to be sensitive to
(subtle cues of) norm violations in the first place. Con-
sequently, an analysis of the link between sustainable
cooperation and community resilience requires two
steps. First, one needs to identify to what degree an
obligation to contribute to the collective is salient in
a community, and the conditions that keep such a
Community resilience: cooperation and space usage
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normative goal frame salient. Then one has to assess to
what degree Ostrom’s design principles are in place
and enforced.
Based on this integrated theoretical framework, the fol-
lowing proposition can be derived: sustained
cooperation within a given community becomes more
likely to the degree that (1) an orientation focusing
on the collective (i.e., a normative goal frame) is
shared and remains cognitively salient in a sizeable
proportion of the collective, and (2) a set of rules
(design principles) is present that enable specifying,
monitoring, and sanctioning first- and second-order
cooperative acts.
Research design and data
Answering the research question required data collec-
tion in low-income collective housing communities in
Mexico City. These communities are located in the
most dangerous parts of the metropolis, and their
inhabitants are notoriously suspicious of outsiders. In
order to minimize personal risks for the researcher,
access to four communities was negotiated based on
the first author’s existing personal contacts (Paterson,
Gregory, & Thorne, 1999). The main selection cri-
terion for a research site to be included was that the
housing community had shared facilities, like a
courtyard.
A multi-method comparative approach was used.
Observational, interview, video and survey data were
collected in four different collective housing commu-
nities with a central courtyard and common facilities
in Mexico City in 2010. Direct observation was per-
formed at irregular intervals over a period of three
months. It included participating in social activities
such as attending meetings, joining lunch and entering
into long, informal conversations. Semi-structured
interviews (of duration between 30 minutes and two
hours) were conducted with three different types of sta-
keholders: two experts in housing and urban develop-
ment, one key informant in each compound, and 14
neighbours. The interviews focused on how social
dynamics in collective housing were shaped by their
social historical context, and on neighbours’ percep-
tions of exposure to different cooperative situations.
Finally, a total of 28 questionnaires were distributed
among participants to capture diverse information,
including socio-economic data. Conversation topics
from video recorder sessions were classified into cat-
egories for further analysis. Secondary sources of infor-
mation supported previously obtained interview and
survey data.
In all four cases, all the houses were on the ground floor
distributed around a central courtyard (Figure 1).
Community 1 (Pedro Anaya 190) is located in Pedro
Figure 1 The courtyards: (a) Pedro Anaya190; (b) Gorostiza 36;
(c) Labradores 23; and (d) Tr|¤poli 910.




Anaya 190, in the Martin Carrera residential area,
north of Mexico City. Community 2 (Trı´poli 910) is
located in Trı´poli 910, in Sta. Cruz Atoyac residential
area, in the central area of the city. Communities 3
and 4 are located in Gorostiza 36 and Labradores 23
respectively in Morelos residential area, near Mexico
City’s historic centre. All neighbours own their dwelling
units, but they share ownership over common areas.
The communities differ with regard to the size (and
shape) of the central courtyard, interior spaces,
housing density, construction quality and common
facilities (Table 1). The size and shape of the courtyards
are important because they affect thedegree towhich the
members of the community are interdependent in terms
of the need to share space (i.e., small and corridor-like
courtyards imply more interdependence, while at the
same time providing fewer opportunities for leisure
activities than spacious, rectangular courtyards).
Analysis
Aswill be elaborated below, the case analyses show that
two of the communities (C2 – Trı´poli and C3 – Goros-
tiza) showclear evidence for sustained formsof collective
action related to both the physical (collective mainten-
ance activities) and the social ‘infrastructure’ (collective
leisure activities). Collective leisure activities included
the organization of celebrations, meetings and gather-
ings, and involve the use of the common space (i.e., the
courtyard). Collective maintenance activities range
from painting and water tank maintenance to carrying
out a variety or repairs. Unlike leisure activities, they
are perceived as actions demanding high levels of sacri-
fice, because individuals have to make larger financial
contributions, and invest more time when participating.
Hence, if the key proposition of this paper holds, the
two communities with sustained collective action
should show signs of a salient normative goal frame
in combination with the CPR design principles being
in place and enforced. In contrast, the communities
without sustained collective action should miss at
least one of the two conditions. The remainder of
this section first addresses the two communities with
sustained collective action and then the communities
where collective action failed (for a summary overview
of the profiles of all four communities along with the
theoretical constructs of this study, see Tables 2 and 3).
Communitieswith sustainable collective
action: Tr|´poli 910 andGorostiza 36
In both cases for these two communities, the central
courtyard consists of a closed structure, therefore pro-
viding clear boundaries (principle 1). There was an
explicit and consistent link between benefit allocation
and responsibilities. For instance, each member was
required to take on her share to keep the central court-
yard free of rubbish, with the consequence that if
someone has a plant, they must sweep their area
more often than the others (principle 2).
Decisions were made in an open and participating
process and rules were taken according to specific
local people’s situations and context (principle 3).
For instance, in both communities, low-income house-
holds with large families were allowed to delay the pay
of their maintenance dues. Tinkering with rules was a
common practice to solve conflicts. An example of
this was seen when the method for collecting money
for common property maintenance works (cleaning
of the water tank and plastic barrels) was changed in
Trı´poli 910. In this case, participants agreed on a
weekly fee in order to pay a worker to do the task.
The agreement did not succeed. They then changed
to a monthly collection that also did not work, and
concluded that the participants who were unable to
pay the fee would contribute in kind: with handwork.
Another example occurred also in Trı´poli 910, where a
Table 1 Descriptions of the four communities
Communities (C) C1 ^ PedroAnaya190 C2 ^ Tr|¤ poli 910 C3 ^ Gorostiza 36 C4 ^ Labradores 23
Size ^ central courtyard Small (1.80 × 36 m) Medium (3.60 × 25 m) Big (4.50 × 18 m) Medium (7.0 × 11m)a
Density (inhabitants/DU) ^ maximum 2.5 (5) 2.5 (6) 4.2 (5) 4.0 (6)
Number of dwellings 24 07 21 15
Dwelling size (m2) 12 40^52 60^140 48
Construction quality Bad Good Good Good
Common facilities Toilet, laundry Laundry None None
Socio-economic status Very low Low^medium high Low^medium Low^medium
Education Illiterate ^ SS PS ^ Uni PS ^ Uni PS ^ HS
Note: aDivided in two opposite sections of each 3.50 ×5.50 m.SS ¼ secondary school; PS ¼ primary school; Uni ¼ university; HS ¼ high school.
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very strict official regulation imposed by an external
authority regarding use of common space, in combi-
nation with high levels of tolerance to other’s actions,
caused generalized deviations from the norm among
participants, thus causing negative externalities to all
of them. Dog faeces in the common courtyard first
caused significant disagreement. The dog’s owner apol-
ogized, but his promise to clean whenever this was
required was only partially fulfilled. But since neigh-
bours liked the dog, the give and take of everyday life
was re-established.
In all four communities, all members can observe what
occurs in the courtyard. Monitoring (principle 4) can
even overrun privacy, up to the point that all other
inhabitants will notice guests of one household. Strict
monitoring facilitated the application of gradual sanc-
tions (principle 5). For instance, in Gorostiza 36, non-
compliance (e.g., not doing her share of painting the
common property), triggered gossip among neigh-
bours. Gossip can be interpreted as a first mild step,
which creates mutual understanding about the infrac-
tion, without sanctioning the offender. Similarly, in
Trı´poli 910 neighbours talked with the dog’s owner
to persuade him to comply with community rules
before taking tough actions against him. All these pro-
cesses occurred in the central courtyard, pointing to its
pivotal function as a conflict management arena (prin-
ciple 6).
Institutional awareness (principle 7) is strong only in
Trı´poli 910. In Gorostiza 36, problems with local auth-
orities arose from activities that were at odds with local
regulations (e.g., informal trade). This complicates the
relationship between community members and local
authorities. In contrast, in Trı´poli 910, institutional
awareness translated into government support when
necessary. For instance, the government accelerated
its actions related to the legal process to transfer own-
ership from a private property regime to a condomi-
nium property regime.
As for conditions contributing to the salience of a nor-
mative goal frame, both communities can draw on
periods of intense and successful previous cooperation.
The latter was induced by some urgent need (e.g.,
fixing the damage to a building), and therefore under-
taken with high external pressure. These forms of
cooperation were directed towards achieving specific
goals and required the participation of a large majority
of community members. This in turn enabled individ-
uals to identify with group interests and objectives,
thus creating a sense of membership and a moral obli-
gation to act in favour of the group.
For example, a non-governmental organization
guided Gorostiza 36 through the remodelling
process after their homes were partially destroyed by
the large 1985 earthquake: a process that can be
Table 2 Overview of the types of cooperation, their triggers and linkageswith CPR andGF theories
C1 ^ PedroAnaya190 C2 ^ Tr|¤ poli 910 C3 ^ Gorostiza 36 C4 ^ Labradores 23
Exogenous triggers ^ incidental
Agency (formal authorities) 3 3 3 3
Defence (external community threats) 3 X 3 3
Urgency (building condition) 3 3 3 3
Endogenous triggers ^ sustainable
Maintenance ^ central courtyard X 3 3 X (past yes)
Maintenance ^ Real estate X 3 3 X (past yes)
Leisure X 3 3 X (past yes)
CommonPool Resource (CPR) principles
1.Clear boundaries 3 3 3 3
2.Equity rules X 3 3 X (past yes)
3. Adaptive rules/participatory process X 3 3 X (past yes)
4.Monitoring 3 3 3 3
5.Gradual sanctions X 3 3 X
6.Con£ict management arenas X 3 3 3
7. Institutional awareness X 3 X X
Goal Framing (GF) theory
Collective orientation X 3 3 X (past yes)
Notes:3 ¼ yes, X ¼ no
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referred to as agency-induced cooperation. Similarly,
this community also had engaged in joint legal
action to stop relocation, or to prevent a thief or
someone who sells banned products from being cap-
tured by police (defence-induced cooperation).
Finally, both communities have experience with
urgency-induced cooperation, arising from poor-
quality construction of buildings. Actions related to
this type of cooperation are: to demolish a roof
before it crashes, to repair a collapsed drain or plumb-
ing pipes, to repair leaky roofs and to restore power.
Such positive previous experiences with cooperation
also had a strong effect on feasibility beliefs. High
levels of interdependency for the achievement of
group goals influenced the belief that everybody in
the community will gain from the different actions,
further strengthening beliefs in the feasibility of the
project. In addition, these collective actions created
and reinforced trust, reciprocity and cohesion
among participants, and it allowed anticipation each
other’s behaviour in future situations of common
good production.
Given that the courtyard in both communities is rela-
tively large, it offered multiple opportunities for
friendly encounters, visibility and the staging of
common events without triggering competition
related to scarcity of space. For example, inhabitants
organized celebrations, meetings and gatherings; they
could keep their plants and pets there; and those with
small apartments could use it as an area in which to
rest and relax. It was perceived to be a safe space, so
also children and older inhabitants came there. Conse-
quently, it played an important role in keeping the nor-
mative goal salient in different ways. Whereas
celebrations and gatherings reinforced group identity,
daily friendly encounters reinforced interpersonal
trust and reciprocity among members. Being a central
and open place, the courtyard allowed the observation
of other community members monitoring compliance
to the group norms, thereby further reinforcing the
normative goal frame.
To conclude, in both cases the co-occurrence of sus-
tained collective action was observed, with both CPR
Table 3 Sustainable cooperation: CPR (courtyard)-based activities



































2.Equity rules To do her fair share:
Cleaning
Painting






Payments at a later day
Switching from payments to
labour
Adapting o⁄cial regulation to
local circumstances
Tinkering exercises:












To make rules and agreements
Resolution of con£icts
To make rules and
agreements
7. Institutional awareness Government support
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theory design principles and GF theory salience of a
normative goal frame.
Communitieswith failed collective action:
Anaya190 and Labradores 23
Stable leisure- and maintenance-based cooperation had
characterized Labradores 23, especially since 1985,
when a non-governmental organization guided this
community through the reconstruction process after
their homes were totally destroyed by an earthquake.
The case material shows, however, that this commu-
nity only meets three of the seven design principles:
the courtyard creates a clear boundary, allows moni-
toring and sometimes it is used as a conflict-manage-
ment arena to solve interpersonal problems
(principles 1, 4 and 6). What is lacking in the insti-
tutional arrangements are clearly defined rules about
equity and participation (principles 2 and 3). Further-
more, there is no evidence of the application of
gradual sanctions (principle 5), and institutional
awareness is low (principle 7). Principles 1, 4 and 6
only apply because of the physical existence of the
courtyard that, for example, allows the monitoring of
actions. Principles 2, 3 and 5 do not apply since
cooperation processes are rather absent.
Interestingly enough, this community can build on the
three forms of incidental cooperation that enhance a
collective orientation and feasibility beliefs, as they
were identified for the two communities with sustained
cooperation. Likewise, the courtyard was relatively
spacious. But there was another development that had
a strong negative impact on the salience of the norma-
tive goal frame: cooperation came under pressure with
the arrival of a group of new neighbours who were
involved in drug trafficking, and who also did not
comply with many of the established norms. They had
not experienced previous incidental cooperation in
this community. Widespread violation of norms
included the appropriation of common areas for
private use, without respecting the turn-taking rules
that were in place, or to listen to music at the highest
volume. Rule breakers had not experienced previous
incidental cooperation in this community. As a result,
they also did not share the identity of the group, result-
ing in a lack of motivation to cooperate.
Neighbours (who had a strong collective identity and a
well-grounded belief in the feasibility of the different
projects rooted in successful past experiences) tried to
make the informal sanctioning system work, but
without success. Once the members of this community
realized that their own attempts to sanction this behav-
iour would not be successful, they appealed to the local
government, requiring active enforcement of the law,
but without success. However, these legal actions
against offenders led to personal threats against those
who promoted them. Hence, a high degree of insti-
tutional awareness of a self-governing system will
only be effective if it can rely on responsive local auth-
orities in those situations where their own capacities of
control are exhausted.
As a consequence of the lack of action, the power
balance in the community shifted in favour of this
group of norm-violating newcomers, causing the
gradual decline of the cooperative arrangements. In
this case, the courtyard had the opposite effect than
in the communities with sustained cooperation. Being
constantly confronted with systematic violation of
the rules undermined the feasibility beliefs in future
collective projects, limiting the use of the courtyard
to interpersonal encounters.
In terms of design principles and previous incidental
cooperation, the second community with failed collec-
tive action, Anaya 190, reveals a similar pattern. Here,
only two of the seven principles were realized: the
courtyard has a clear boundary and is used for moni-
toring, but it is not used as a conflict-management
arena. And like the other three communities, it can
build on the three types of successful past cooperation.
Particularly urgency-induced cooperation, arising
from the poor construction quality of the buildings,
triggered a long list of collective actions in this commu-
nity. As in all other previous cases, these forms of
cooperation were directed towards achieving specific
goals, enabling individuals to identify with group inter-
ests and objectives, thus creating a collective identity.
However, the normative goal frame could not be
maintained.
What contributed to the erosion of a collective orien-
tation in this community is the relatively small size of
the courtyard. The resulting scarcity of common and
private space resulted in internal conflict due to perma-
nent interaction and lack of privacy (excessive moni-
toring). Solutions such as expansion of interior spaces
to alleviate overcrowding or to improve services or
infrastructure were not possible due to lack of financial
resources. The possibility to alleviate this problem by
applying for a governmental support programme was
frustrated by the fact that several community
members came into conflict with local regulations,
resulting in local authorities not granting the necessary
resources. Thus, collective actions in this community
were limited to incidental actions carried out under
high external pressure.
In sum, the two communities that failed to sustain col-
lective action not only exhibit deficiencies with regard
to the implementation of CPR design principles but
also show clear signs of a severely weakened normative
goal frame. Again, both cases are in line with the





The patterns observed in each of the four cases are in line
with the general theoretical propositiondeveloped in this
paper: sustained collective action related to the mainten-
ance of a viable physical and social infrastructure ismore
likely in communities whose members share a salient
normative goal frame and who implemented proper
institutional arrangements to solve CPR dilemmas.
These findings suggest that researchers and practitioners
analysing theworkingof thedesignprinciples shouldpay
closer and more systematic attention to the absence or
presence of conditions that affect the salience of the nor-
mative goal frame. This study also allows for several
other preliminary conclusions.
First, the study shows that the processes and structures in
the four communities are congruent with the principles
of the widely used CPR theory, but also with GF
theory. In fact, the latter allowed identifying collective
action-related processes that would have been neglected
by CPR theory. This concurs with previous research
(Wittek, 1999): ethnographic evidence suggests previous
incident-related forms of cooperation delivered under
conditions of high external pressure can foster collective
identity. These forms of cooperation (described below)
may be one of the preconditions for the normative
goal-frame to be activated, and increase the probability
of sustained collective leisure andmaintenance activities.
Second, the presented casematerial revealed three types
of incidental collective action geared towards the sol-
ution of problems originated from ‘outside’ players or
the physical environment: agency, defence and
urgency. By their very nature, the resulting cooperation
is directed towards the solution of an imminent
problem, and is not intended to endure over time.
Here, a word of caution is required. Since the four com-
munities all had experienced successful incidental
cooperation in the past, practitioners and policy-
makers may be tempted to assume that after having
experienced the benefits of collective action and
having developed beliefs in the feasibility of future pro-
jects, cooperative behaviour will ‘automatically’ trans-
fer to sustained collective action related to
maintenance and leisure activities. This is definitely
not the case in two of the four communities under study.
Third, the case material shows two different triggers for
the non-emergence and decay of sustained collective
action. A small courtyard, in combination with poor
financial conditions, prevented the emergence of
durable joint maintenance and leisure activities in one
of the communities. The arrival of a coalition of norm-
violating and economically more powerful newcomers,
in combination with insufficient formal rule enforce-
ment, caused thedecayofcooperation in the secondcom-
munity. Hence, a high degree of institutional awareness
of a self-governing system will only be effective if it can
rely on responsive local authorities in those situations
where their capacities of control are exhausted.
Fourth, the qualitative material in this study revealed
that in low-income collective housing areas in mega-
agglomerations like Mexico City, courtyards not only
may constitute (and be analysed as) a common pool
urban resource but also they can play an important
role in keeping a normative goal frame salient and
strengthening feasibility beliefs. For this to happen,
members of the community need to share an orien-
tation towards the group, and courtyards need to be
large enough not to become a source of conflict over
scarce space and related resources. That is, courtyards
should meet the criteria defining CPRs, creating
benefits for their users.
Fifth, this study shows the importance of collective
action in building resilient urban low-income commu-
nities. Collective action enables community members
to maintain a stable community in the absence of exter-
nal shocks and implement actions for recovery after
disturbances. Moreover, this study demonstrates that
sustained collective action is a necessary condition
for maintaining and improving the physical infrastruc-
ture, thereby increasing communities’ capacity to
absorb external impacts. Courtyards used and per-
ceived as CPRs constituted crucial elements facilitating
forms of sustained collective action related to the main-
tenance of physical and social infrastructure.
A limitation of this study needs to be mentioned. Being
exploratory in nature, this study focused on a limited
selectionof communities,with a very specificownership
regime, socio-demographic background and spatial
layout. Of course, this limits the generalizability of the
empirical findings. Future studies might want to focus
on larger samples and more standardized forms of
measurement to explore further the conditions under
which cooperation becomes sustained, including an
effort to understand the relationship between the
dimensions of the common space, its function, fre-
quency of interaction, quality and types of cooperation.
To conclude, the present study also points to poten-
tially fruitful areas for future investigation. It calls for
the development of empirical research designs that dis-
entangle the differential effects of the two key mechan-
isms for sustainable collective action, CPR design
principles and GF, but also their interplay. Such
research designs should implement more direct psycho-
metric measures assessing collective orientations, goal
frame salience and feasibility beliefs, as well as how
community members actually perceive the institutional
arrangements related to the management of court-
yards. In relation to the physical layout of the facility,
what constitutes an ‘optimal’ courtyard size with
regard to facilitating the emergence of sustained
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collective action for maintenance and leisure appears
to be a fruitful area for future research.
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Endnote
1Ostrom mentions an eighth principle, which refers to multiple
layers of governance in case of large systems. Since the focus of
the present study is on small-scale local contexts, the authors
do not address this principle.
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